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Abstract 
This study re-evaluates the impact of natural resources on growth using panel data and a 
factor-efficiency  accounting  framework.  The  resource-curse  thesis  is  dismissed  as  capital 
efficiency  is  improved  by  geographically-concentrated  natural  resources,  which  hinder 
institutional quality in recent cross-section studies. This consensus does not hold in our case 
even when we use unadjusted resource proxies and the standard institutional approach, as 
both  concentrated  and diffuse  resources  show negative  effects in  low  institutional-quality 
countries. Adequate fiscal policy seems to prevent the curse in that case, but reduces the 
positive effect of concentrated resources found with our adjusted proxy. 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper we reassess the impact of natural resources on economic growth. The analysis 
takes into account the latest developments in the recent literature of the “resource curse”, a 
puzzling  empirical  result  that  associates  countries’  natural-resource  abundance  and 
dependence with lower economic growth after controlling for other relevant characteristics. 
The hypothesis of a resource curse was suggested by a large number of cross-section studies 
initiated by Sachs and Warner (1995),
1 becoming a stylized fact (Wright, 2001). 
The first explanations for this paradox were based on the structuralist theses of the 
1950s,
2 but none was unequivocally confirmed by empirical studies.
3 The same happened 
with tests on Dutch-Disease arguments,
4 where the non-resource sector, assumed as the long-
run engine growth, is hindered by the resource sector, namely through real exchange rate 
appreciation or the absorption of production factors (e.g., Neary and van Wijnbergen, 1986). 
The case study led by Auty (2001a) also dismisses this thesis by showing the complexity and 
diversity of cases among natural-resource abundant countries, including several exceptions to 
the curse, such as Norway, which has seized its oil abundance to become a rich country.  
Other explanations for the resource curse, often presented autonomously, can also be 
partly  considered  as  symptoms  of  the  Dutch  Disease.  These  arguments  include  the 
disincentive for entrepreneurship (Sachs  and Warner, 2001),
5  the  decrease in savings and 
                                                
1 E.g., Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999, 2001), and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). 
2 E.g., Prebisch (1950), and Hirschman (1958). 
3 E.g., Dawe (1996), and Fosu (1996). 
4 E.g., Leite and Weidmann (2002) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). 
5 The general crowding-out logic of Dutch Disease can be extended to entrepreneurship: if wages in the natural 
resources sector pays well enough to attract potential innovators and entrepreneurs (in a limited number), this 
will reduce business talent in the manufacturing industry.   3 
physical investment (Gylfason,  2001a) and lower  investment in human capital (Gylfason, 
2001b; Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 2007). 
Another thesis stresses the negative effect on growth caused by rent-seeking activities 
linked with natural-resource abundance (e.g., Torvik, 2002). As natural-resource abundance 
only penalises growth in some countries, this thesis has very little explanatory power (Bulte et 
al., 2005), leading to the development of models where results depend on initial conditions 
(e.g., Acemoglu, 1995; Baland and François, 2000). In addition, the concern is not specific 
with natural resources, but with any source of rents (Lederman and Maloney, 2008).  
There is now a growing consensus about the importance of institutions in explaining the 
resource curse,
6 as stressed by a recent World Bank publication (Hartford and Klein, 2005). 
Mehlum et al. (2006), for example, conclude that better institutions can avoid the resource 
curse, but they stress the possibility that natural resources affect institutional quality.  
That possibility is recognised by explanations based on endogenous institutions, where 
the type of natural resource affects the institutional context, in which the form of government 
and the quality of policies are the main aspects (e.g., Auty, 2001a,b; Ross, 2001; Atkinson 
and Hamilton, 2003). Leite and Weidmann (2002), for example, found no direct impact of 
natural-resource abundance on economic growth from 1970 to 1990, but they showed an 
important indirect effect through the impact of those resources on corruption, which, in turn, 
negatively affects growth (e.g., Mauro, 1995). 
This result was confirmed by Isham et al. (2005) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003), who examined the influence of natural resources on broader indicators of institutional 
quality and policies. They confirmed that, for a given level of institutional quality, natural-
resource abundance has no direct impact on growth. Rather, this abundance penalises growth 
                                                
6 The high importance of institutions and policies to economic growth is stressed by a vast number of empirical 
studies (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2005).   4 
indirectly,  through  institutional  quality,  but  only  when  resources  are  geographically 
concentrated (these agglomerations of resources are also known as “resource points”), such as 
oil.
7 That is, these recent studies explain the resource curse through the negative effect of 
geographically concentrated resources on the quality of institutions.
8 
Following Sachs and Warner (1995), these and the majority of studies on the resource 
curse measure natural-resource abundance as the share of total merchandise exports or GDP. 
Other studies, which explore the impact of more direct measures of mining production or 
reserves, find distinct results concerning the impact of geographically-concentrated resources, 
as pointed by Lederman and Maloney (2008). Stijins (2005) found no correlation of fuel and 
mineral reserves on growth during 1970-1989, while Davis (1995) showed that countries with 
a high share of minerals in exports and GDP performed relatively well in the same period. In 
fact, the mining share in GDP belongs to the set of variables positively associated with growth 
across the several million regressions in Sala-i-Martin et al (2004). Recently, Nunn (2008) 
found a positive relation between per capita production of gold, oil, and diamonds and GDP 
per capita, and Brunnschweiler (2008) showed that per capita mineral and fuel production in 
1970 benefited growth during 1970-2000. 
In addition, the vast majority of empirical results on the resource curse are based on 
cross-section  analyses,  where  countries’  economic  growth  in  a  single  extended  period  is 
regressed to a series of explanatory variables, including natural resources.  
A recent panel study by Manzano and Rigobon (2006) showed evidence of unobserved 
fixed country effects, implying that the estimates of the traditional cross-section regressions 
may be inconsistent. Using panels with two or four time series and Sachs and Warner (1995) 
                                                
7 In turn, diffuse resources, such as agricultural and forest products, were not correlated with institutional quality. 
8 Boschini et al (2007) show the negative effect is larger in the case of diamonds and precious metals for 
countries with low institutional quality.    5 
data, the authors found that the resource curse result disappears once one allows for fixed 
effects in a panel regression. They sustain that the degree of development and the quality of 
institutions  are  not  the  cause  of  the  curse  (they  point,  instead,  to  the  debt  overhang  in 
resource-rich countries due to the rise and fall in commodity prices in the 70’s and 80’s, 
respectively), but they cannot allow for fixed effects in this case as their institutional quality 
proxy does not change over time. In addition, the results may depend on period aggregation. 
We broaden the scope of literature by assessing the premise of a resource curse in a 
single  extended-panel  analysis  of  a  growth  accounting  model  where  natural  resources 
(geographically diffused or concentrated) affect the efficiency gains of labour and capital in 
production,  along  with  the  most  important  growth  determinants.  In  order  to  estimate  the 
unobserved efficiency gains (the Solow residual), we consider that factor’s prices reflect their 
quality, which is also an important growth accounting result, as stressed by Barro (1999). 
By using panel-data analysis, we increase the efficiency of our estimation, associated 
with the larger number of observations (around one thousand, arising from the available data 
on the chosen growth determinants in two hundred and eight countries from 1976 to 2005). 
We are also able to control the presence of unobserved country and time effects, which, if not 
considered, lead to inconsistent estimates, and we have evidence of such effects in the panel 
study by Manzano and Rigobon (2006). Finally, taking into account institutional quality as a 
cause of labour efficiency we can show whether the most recent and consensual explanation 
of the resource curse in cross-section studies is still relevant in a panel-data case. Unlike 
Manzano and Rigobon (2006), we also measure institutional quality over time to allow for 
fixed-effects estimation, considering the interpretation of institutions as a reflection of policy 
outcomes that are in a state of flux (e.g., Dodrik et al, 2004; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008).  
In short, with the estimated panel growth accounting model we intend to assess: (i) the 
effect of natural resources on economic growth through capital and labour efficiency; (ii) if   6 
both the type of resource and institutional quality are relevant to that assessment, as stressed 
in recent cross-section studies; (iii) the relative importance of the proposed growth factors. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we deduce an estimated growth model and 
present the estimation strategy. Section III shows the main estimation results, including the 
growth  decomposition  for  two  countries  rich  in  concentrated  resources  but  with  distinct 
economic outcomes. In section IV, we present our conclusions. 
 
II. Estimation procedures and data 
In this section, we outline our empirical strategy, starting with the development of a growth 
accounting framework with factor efficiency, and present the data. 
 
Growth accounting model with factor efficiency 
Let us consider the following neoclassical (Cobb-Douglas) production function with constant 
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(i) Y is the real aggregate output; (ii) L is the labour level; (iii) K is the aggregate capital 
stock; (iv) f is the labour efficiency; (v) g is the capital efficiency; (vi) a  is the labour share 
in production; and (vii) Lf and Kg are, respectively, the labour factor and the capital factor 
measured in units of efficiency, which compares with L and K, both expressed in conventional 
units. Thus, quality advances in physical inputs are captured by f and g in (1). 
The constant returns to scale assumption in Lf and Kg means that excluded factors are 
trivial to growth. Since apparently natural-resource scarcity does not place a direct restriction 
on growth (e.g., Nordhaus, 1992; Meier and Rauch, 2000, Romer, 2005), the omission as a 
                                                
9 The assumption of a one-sector economy implies that we will not test the Dutch Disease thesis, which is 
dismissed  by  cross-section  studies  and  does  not  account  for  the  diversity  of  cases  among  natural-resource 
abundant countries (Auty, 2001a), as mentioned in the previous section.   7 
productive factor or a windfall seems adequate.
10 However, considering recent resource-curse 
studies, natural resources may affect f and g. Although this effect appears negative in a cross-
country analysis (the curse), the experience of several countries shows that these resources 
can be well managed (for instance, invested in human capital) and thus benefit growth. 
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in which the circumflex accent conveys the growth rate of the respective variable. 
As the efficiency levels f and g are not observable, we consider that they are a function 
of several variables, including natural resources. The empirical equations proposed below for 
f and g, which together evaluate Total Factor Productivity (TFP), are in line with Coe and 
Helpman  (1995)  and  Coe  et  al.  (1997).  Thus, they  are  also  built  on  endogenous  growth 
models based on R&D (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) and on 
human capital (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Mincer, 1993).
11  
 
                                                
10 In recent literature, physical limits to growth caused by natural-resource scarcity or excessive pollution have 
not been considered relevant (Nordhaus, 1992; Meyer and Rauch, 2000; Romer, 2005). This occurs because 
those physical limits can be overcome by technological progress, forces of substitution and structural change 
when natural-resource scarcity is reflected in market prices (Meier and Rauch, 2000). If there is open access to 
resources, economic agents must be forced to consider the associated social value through adequate policies and 
institutions. It should be noted, however, that environmental impacts associated with climate change are much 
more difficult to reverse as they show a high persistence in time, posing tremendous immediate challenges to 
avoid aggravated economic costs in the future, as recognised by the Stern Report (2006). Nevertheless, this kind 
of analysis depends upon the social discount rate adopted, and climate changes are difficult to predict despite 
science advances. Thus, the impact on growth caused by climate change or the referred physical limits associated 
with natural-resource scarcity are not considered in this paper. 
11 Indeed, the specification forms are closely related with Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (1997) and the 
independent variables embody domestic and foreign R&D and domestic human-capital accumulation.   8 
Specification for labour efficiency 
Assuming the functional form of constant elasticity, we propose the following expression for 






































) ( , where:  (3) 
(i) F is a scale factor; (ii) I is the investment; (iii) T assesses international trade; (iv) IQ is the 
institutional-quality variable; (v) NresP (natural resource points) conveys the geographically-
concentrated natural-resource abundance; (vi) NresD evaluates the diffuse natural-resource 
abundance; (vii)  1 a  and  2 a  are (constant) elasticities of labour efficiency in relation to  L
I  and 
L
T ; (viii)  3 a ,  4 a  and  5 a  are (constant) semi-elasticities of f in relation to IQ,  L
NresP  and  L
NresD , 
respectively; as f refers to the labour efficiency unit, variables were divided by L, except in 
the case of IQ. All variables are namely based on several empirical studies on the subject.
12 
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Since  f ˆ  is not observable, the first order condition (FOC) for maximizing profit in 
relation to L is used to derive  f ˆ as a function of: (i) real wage growth per worker,  w ˆ ; (ii)  L ˆ ; 
(iii)  K ˆ ; and (iv)  g ˆ , which, in turn, is affected by a set of other variables, as shown below. 
From the FOC  ) ( ) (
) ( t w t L
t Y = ¶
¶ , we obtain:
13 
                                                
12 Among these studies, we stress for: I (e.g., Englander and Gurney, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004); T 
(e.g., Frankel and Romer, 1999; Lewer and van den Berg, 2003); IQ (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2005, Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006); NresP and NresD (e.g., Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Isham et al., 2005).  
13 This was preferred to the use of the first order condition for maximizing profit in relation to K because the 
human-capital improvements are already reflected in wages, as we explain later on.   9 
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and, in terms of growth factors, 
) ( ˆ ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ t g t K t f t L t w a a a a - + - + + - = .  (6) 
To some extent, wages reflect human-capital advances. Thus, the inclusion of wages 
through the use of the profit-maximizing condition justifies the exclusion of human capital in 
determining f in (3) and thus in (4), as suggested by endogenous-growth models (e.g., Lucas, 
1988, and Romer, 1990), or by empirical studies supported by these models (e.g., Barro, 
1991; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Englander and Gurney, 1994). 
In addition to human capital, the other crucial factor of long-run productivity growth is 
R&D (e.g., Englander and Gurney, 1994),
14 which is included below in the specification of g.  
 
Specification for capital efficiency 
Assuming the functional form of constant elasticity, we propose the following expression for 





































) ( ,  (7) 
where: (i) G is a scale factor; (ii) RD stands for R&D; (iii) Inf represents infra-structures;
15 
(iv)  1 b and  2 b  are (constant) elasticities of g in relation to RD and Inf, respectively; and (v) 
3 b and  4 b  are (constant) semi-elasticities of capital efficiency in relation to  K
NresP  and  K
NresD , 
                                                
14 The introduction of R&D and monopolistic competition in growth theory began with Romer (1987, 1990) and 
included seminal contributions from Aghion and Howit (1992), namely. 
15 Notice that the direct impact of physical infrastructures on growth is already captured by K – here we evaluate 
the effect on overall capital efficiency.   10 
respectively;
 as g refers to the capital-efficiency unit, variables were divided by K. This set of 
variables is also based on several (namely empirical) studies on growth.
16  
All  explanatory  variables in f  could also be used in  g and  vice-versa. We chose to 
include variables other than natural resources where they are expected to have the greatest 
impact to preserve the usual functional form of constant elasticity. Indeed, due to perfect 
collinearity,  this  functional  form  does  not  allow  a  separate  estimation  of  the  variables’ 
impacts in f and g, as will become clear later on. Since we want to analyze resource effects in 
f and g, the associated coefficients are included as semi-elasticities, overcoming problems of 
collinearity. Considering that natural resources affect IQ through labour efficiency in several 
recent  resource  curse  studies  (e.g.  Torvik,  2002;  Isham  et  al.,  2005;  Sala-i-Martin  and 
Subramanian, 2003), its coefficient is also included as semi-elasticity in f but not in g.  
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Substituting  g ˆ  in (6), we have: 
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j d =   5;   4,   3,   2,   1,   if     = j a j a 6 d = ) 1 ( a - ;  j d = 10   9,   8,   , 7   if   ) 1 ( 6 = - - j bj a ; u(t) is a white noise. 
The estimation of (9) allows us to obtain estimates of a  (from 6 d ),  1 a  up to  5 a  and  1 b  
up to  4 b . We can then use these values to estimate  f ˆ in (4),  g ˆ  in (8) and  y ˆ  in (2). However, 
since  the  wage  equation  is  based  on  the  FOC  for  maximizing  profit  in  relation  to  L,  it 
expresses labour productivity growth. Thus, the assessment of the resource curse is made 
                                                
16 Among these studies, we highlight for: RD (e.g., Coe and Helpman, 1995; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004); Inf 
(e.g., Argimón et al., 1997; Roller and Waverman, 2001).   11 
directly in (9) through the analysis of the sign, intensity and significance of the NresP and 
NresD coefficients as the estimates also evaluate the impact of those variables on growth. 
 
Panel estimation model 
With  panel  data  we  also  have  variability  from  country  to  country.  Besides  improving 
estimation  efficiency,  panel  estimation  allows  the  control  of  unobserved  individual 
heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002), an econometric problem leading to inconsistent estimates 
if there are omitted unobserved variables correlated with the explanatory variables. 
The estimation of panel data models requires the choice of several assumptions to deal 
with the possibility of an unobserved individual element, which, in our case, can be a country 
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the wage equation (9) in a panel data formulation with a constant term  0 d  is either:
17 
(i)  ( ) it
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in case of the Pooled OLS and the REM with time and country effects, where  it t i it d c w j + + =  
(being i the country, ci the country effect, dt the time effect and wit a white noise); or 
(ii)  ( ) it
j




75 ˆ ,  (11) 
for the FEM with time and country effects, where  t i it d c ￿ ￿ + + = 0 .
18  
                                                
17 Notice that we also consider lagged variables, not included in vector X, but only RD lags produced interesting 
results, as referred in the next section, in addition to the use of lags of IQ as an instrument of the variable in order 
to avoid endogeneity problems. 
18 The FEM asks how group and/or time affect the intercept, while the REM analyses error variance structures 
affected by group and/or time (Park, 2005). In both, slopes are assumed unchanged. The pooled OLS model is 
based on the idea that countries would react in the same way to changes in explanatory  variables and that   12 
By including GDP per capita in 1975 for each country i ( i GDPpc75 ), in (10) and (11), 
we want to assess the conditional-convergence hypothesis of countries: q<0 (>0) conveys a 
smaller  (higher)  productivity  growth  in  richer  countries  and  thus  the  convergence 
(divergence) of countries. In general, the FEM produces more robust results as it ensures the 
consistency of estimates without loss of observations. However, if we are interested in the 
effect of a time-constant variable in a panel-data study, the robustness of the fixed-effects 
estimator  is  almost  useless  (Wooldridge,  2002).  In  this  case,  we  will  get  an  inconsistent 
estimate if the FEM is the appropriate model. The fixed-country effect in (11) impedes our 
checking of conditional convergence: q cannot be estimated by the FEM since  i GDPpc75  is 
independent of t. In section III, we report the results for this coefficient with regression (10). 
 
Data statistics and choice of proxies for main variables and their interaction 
The weight of natural resources in exports (or in GDP) has been used as a measure of a 
country’s abundance of those resources since Sachs and Warner (1995).
19 It evaluates the 
reliance on resource exports and, as a flow, is only an imperfect proxy of a country’s real 
stock of natural resources (e.g., Bulte et al., 2005). The share of natural resources in exports 
can  only  be  a  strict  measure  of  natural-resource  abundance  if  there  is  an  invariable  and 
consistent relationship between the stocks and exports of these resources. 
To assess whether the abundance of resources is effectively a “curse” and that the results 
of the standard analyses are not spurious, Bulte et al. (2005) consider that empirical analyses 
                                                                                                                                                   
intercepts are the same for all countries. The choice of the adequate estimation model is made in view of several 
test statistics, as we show in the next section when presenting our main results. 
19 Although both measures are used, the share of natural resource in exports proved more robust than the weight 
of  resource exports in GDP in cross-section curse analyses (Lederman and Maloney, 2008), namely in the Sachs 
and Warner (1995) study.   13 
must be based on resource stock measures (see also Stijins, 2005).
20 Yet, Gylfason (2001b) 
used the weight of natural capital in countries’ wealth in 1994 (World Bank estimates, 1997) 
and also concluded that there is an inverse relationship between growth and natural-resource 
abundance assessed by that indicator, thus confirming the cross-section curse result. 
In using the weight of natural resources in exports (or in GDP), we must also bear in 
mind that it is an imperfect measure of abundance and dependence due to possibility of re-
exportation, which, in countries like Singapore, is crucial. Sachs and Warner (1995) adjusted 
this effect considering natural-resource net exports in this country, but using the unadjusted 
measure for other countries will lead to overestimation of resource abundance.  
As we show in Appendix 1, our proxies for NresP and NresD are, respectively, the 
weight of fuels, ores and metals in merchandise exports, and the weight of agricultural raw 
materials and food products in merchandise exports, following previous studies such as Leite 
and Weidmann (2002). To alleviate the re-exportation problem, we subtracted, for each type 
of resource, the weight in merchandise imports to the share of merchandise exports (we also 
added 100 to get an index), in line with Owens and Wood (1997) net export dependence 
proxy. This means that the adjusted measures of abundance take into account the importance 
of each type of resource on export and import structures. In our estimations, we compare the 
results with the adjusted and unadjusted proxies to confront with previous studies’ results.  
In  the  case  of  the  institutional  quality  variable,  we  consider,  in  line  with  the  cross 
section study by Brunnshweiler and Bulte (2008), two different perspectives: one that sees 
institutions as “deep and durable” characteristics of societies (IQ ‘stable’ approach), usually 
considered in resource curse studies, and another that views them as a reflection of policy 
outcomes  that  are  in  a  state  of  flux  (IQ  ‘policies’  approach).  We  agree  that  both 
                                                
20 Unfortunately, estimates of natural-capital stock in a significant number of countries are only available for few 
years, and thus are not suited for a single-extended panel study like ours.   14 
interpretations are potentially relevant for the resource curse analysis, but we show that the IQ 
‘policies’ approach is more adequate in a panel-data study.  
Since proxies for the IQ ‘stable’ approach are, by definition, almost constant over time, 
they are not suited for a panel estimation allowing unobserved fixed effects and, as already 
mentioned, we have evidence of those effects in Manzano and Rigobon (2006) panel study. 
To evaluate the impact of this institutional approach, we conducted our initial estimations 
considering countries rated by the Freedom House as “Free” (average classification of civil 
liberties and politic rights bellow a value of 3) in 1975,
21 and countries classified as partially 
or not free, thus separating high from low institutional quality – from now on, we will denote 
these sub samples as F75 and PNF75, respectively. Since our panel begins in 1976, we avoid 
potential endogeneity problems by using the 1975 rating. 
The IQ variable included in estimation forms corresponds to the IQ ‘policies’ approach, 
allowing for higher time variability. We chose as a proxy the government budget balance in 
percentage of GDP, which captures the fiscal-policies quality in studies such as Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) and Burnside and Dollar (2000), with the advantage of data availability for a 
large number of countries and years.
22 We argue that fiscal-policy quality is related to the 
quality of policies in general,
23 and may be, in itself, central for the study of the resource 
curse.  Norway, an  example  of good natural-resource state-management,  saves part of the 
associated rents and distributes them between generations through a public fund – this is 
captured by an increase in our institutional quality measure.  
                                                
21 We use the first available value when the information does not exist for 1975.  
22 Notice that an increase of public investment, which decreases the budget balance and fosters growth, is already 
captured by the investment variable I in our model. 
23 According to Mauro (1995), the measures of corruption and various aspects of bureaucratic efficiency are 
highly correlated, while Stein (2005) associates the quality of legislative capabilities, in general, to the quality of 
policies, namely fiscal. Thus, we assume that the quality of different policies is also correlated.   15 
To consider the deferred effect of policies on growth and avoid potential endogeneity 
problems, we first instrument our proxy with its period lags and then we estimate the main 
regression using a 2SLS approach.
24 We hypothesize that past and present good fiscal policies 
(and good policies, in general) can prevent a negative effect of natural resources on growth. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the available data for the main variables in 
our unbalanced panel of 208 countries from 1976 to 2005. 
Table 1 – descriptive statistics of main variables 
 
All countries (n=208) 
 
F75 sub sample (n=59) 
 
PNF75 sub sample (n=129) 
 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
GDPpc growth  1.491  7.171  2.115  5.590  1.133  7.915 
w ˆ   1.379  8.841  1.510  5.872  1.183  11.981 
) ˆ ˆ ( L I -   1.464  22.413  1.881  16.686  1.001  27.361 
) ˆ ˆ ( L T -   3.779  14.980  3.748  14.155  3.813  15.842 
IQ  -3.149  6.002  -2.520  4.936  -3.538  6.545 
NresD unadjusted  29.592  27.361  27.708  27.770  30.939  26.990 
NresP unadjusted  24.128  30.738  16.416  23.811  29.556  33.761 
NresD adjusted  114.677  26.520  113.935  25.204  115.215  27.428 
NresP adjusted  108.573  32.905  100.216  21.933  114.531  37.773 
L ˆ   1.492  5.129  1.609  3.936  1.362  6.188 
K ˆ   3.581  4.251  3.709  3.347  3.505  4.703 
) ˆ ˆ ( K f In -   9.040  14.349  6.407  10.355  10.507  15.965 
) ˆ ˆ ( K D R -   -3.202  43.934  -3.998  33.121  -2.598  50.626 
 
Notes: percent values (of growth rates and ratios) except in the case of adjusted resource proxies, which convey indices. 
                                                
24 This also dilutes the positive correlation of our IQ proxy (the budget balance) with the natural-resource proxies 
due to the contemporaneous associated rents captured by the state, as they are generally not completely spent.   16 
We highlight the higher real growth rates of per capita GDP and wage per worker in free 
countries, reflecting the positive impact of institutional quality, which is confirmed by above 
average budget balances, our measure for the quality of policies. Free countries present higher 
increases in I, K and L, but smaller augments in Inf compared to other countries (mostly 
developing countries, still insufficiently infrastrutured). They also present a surprising worse 
RD performance, probably due to a superior number of patent applications to regional patent 
offices, which are not covered by the available data as pointed in Appendix 1. The proxies for 
natural resources show that free countries are slightly less abundant in diffuse resources and 
significantly less rich in concentrated resources with adjusted and unadjusted measures.  
Figure 1 plots the growth in real GDPpc from 1975 to 2005 for 94 countries against 
their natural-resource abundance in 1975, measured by the sum of NresD and NresP. As 
expected, it depicts the negative correlation that embodies the resource curse. This was also 
found separately for NresD and NresP with unadjusted and adjusted proxies. 
Figure 1 - GDPpc average growth rate from 1975 to 2005 and resource abundance in 1975 
(unadjusted proxy)  
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III. Results 
Table 1  shows the main estimation results for the wage equation without the  conditional 
convergence variable – estimation forms (10) and (11). We remember that the estimate of 
) ˆ ˆ ( L K -  represents capital elasticity, and the other coefficients correspond to the impacts of the 
associated variables on real wage growth per worker,w ˆ , equal to labour productivity growth 
in our model, and thus on output growth, Y ˆ, where we focus the analysis.
25  
The estimations with our unbalanced panel data produced 880 observations using the 
full sample and the instrumented IQ variable.
26 This instrumentation reduced the estimation 
period to 1976-2002 as we used a three-period lag of the variable as an instrument. In the last 
regression (8), we extended the period to 1976-2005 using the original IQ proxy since the 
results  did  not  alter  our  final  conclusions  with  the  instrumented  proxy  in  regression  7, 
obtaining near one thousand observations for eighty countries. Since unbalanced panels may 
suffer from selectivity bias, in Appendix 2 we present the estimated number of years for each 
of  those  countries.  An  inspection  of  the  Table  reveals  enough  variability  of  resource 
abundance and economic outcomes to exclude severe selectivity bias problems.  
According to the test statistics, the FEM is the adequate estimation procedure in most 
regressions (estimation form 11), except in 2, where the REM was used. Under fixed-country 
effects, the convergence-variable estimate is inconsistent since only the Pooled OLS or the 
REM procedure can be used – estimation form (10). The convergence variable is statistically 
insignificant with either of these estimations in view of the different scenarios for inclusion of 
                                                
25 The estimated impact of  K ˆ  on  Y ˆ  is given in Table 1 by the coefficient of ) ˆ ˆ ( L K - , which we then subtract 
from 1 to obtain the effect by L ˆ .  
26 We used as instruments, besides the constant term, a three-period lag of IQ with the full sample, and a two-
period lag with the sub samples, as they revealed low correlation with  w ˆ and high correlation with IQ. The 
instrumental regressions are not presented, but they can be made available upon request.   18 
IQ and the adjustment of resource variables, while most growth econometrics provide support 
for  conditional  convergence  (e.g.,  Sala-i-Martin,  2000).  However,  as  already  stated,  our 
analysis of convergence is not correct if the adequate model is the FEM. 
 
Table 2 – Wage equations (1976-2005) 




















(b)  4.518  1.634  3.083  5.314  4.539  5.145  4.891  4.436 
LM 
(c)  3.06  14.98  0.44  7.02  3.00  7.03  7.55  6.80 
Hausman 
(d)  134.16  6.53  25.08  45.44  129.56  46.48  42.94  106.02 
Sample  Full  F 75  PNF 75  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full 
Res. Proxies  Unadj.  Unadj.  Unadj.  Unadj.  Adj.  Adj.  Adj./K, L  Adj./K, L 
IQ included  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Yes, not 
instr. 
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Observations  1086  723  363  880  1086  880  880  1005 
R
2  0.461  0.421 
(f)  0.540  0.512  0.462  0.518  0.521  0.495 
Adjusted R
2  0.394  0.355 
(f)  0.408  0.449  0.396  0.449  0.451  0.427 
 
Notes: T-ratios appear below the coefficients’ estimates. 
*, 
** and 
*** mean that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
(a) G&T stands for a joint Group (country) and Time effect. 
(b) The F test determines the choice between 
the Pooled OLS Model and the FEM 
(c) The LM test determines the choice between the Pooled OLS Model and the REM. 
(d) 
The Hausman test determines the choice between the FEM and the REM. In the F, LM and Hausman tests we prefer the 
joint time and country effect model to models with only one of those effects whenever the G&T test statistics are significant; 
(e) To avoid values close to zero, ratios with L were multiplied by 10
3 and ratios with K by 10
9, expressing in all cases 
indices of export abundance per unit of factor; 
(f) From the FEM G&T; estimations obtained with Limdep 8.0 software. 
In regression 1, we exclude our IQ ‘policies’ variable and focus on the impact of unadjusted 
resource proxies on overall factor efficiency and growth as they are left undivided by L and K 
to better compare the results with previous resource-curse studies. Leaving NresD and NresP 
undivided by labour and capital stocks in expression (9), the associated coefficients become, 
respectively,  ( ) 10 5 d d +   and  ( ) 9 4 d d + ,  representing the effects  on  w ˆ  and  Y ˆ. We  observe a   20 
significant, at 10%, negative effect of both measures on growth. This is in line with cross-
section curse results but not with Manzano and Rigobon (2006) panel study, which shows an 
insignificant natural-resource impact on growth allowing for fixed effects.
27  
When  we  consider  the  standard  ‘stable’  institutional  quality  approach,  using  the 
Freedom  House  classification  in  1975,  we  find  that  natural-resources  impacts  are  not 
significant at 10% in countries rated as Free, our proxy for good quality of institutions (see 
regression 2). The unadjusted resource measures hinder growth only in countries with low 
institutional quality (regression 3), but the negative impact is not confined to concentrated 
resources in our case, unlike recent cross-section curse explanations based on institutions. 
We  then  introduced  our  instrumented  IQ  ‘policies’  variable  in  the  sample  of  low 
institutional quality countries, and found that resource proxies no longer have a significant 
effect.
28 This also happens when we consider the whole sample (regression 4), suggesting that 
adequate past and present fiscal policy (in countries with low ‘stable’ institutional quality), 
significant at 10%, can prevent a negative impact of natural resources on growth. Thus, it 
seems that the more flexible time variant IQ ‘policies’ approach dismisses the cross-section 
curse explanation based on ‘stable’ institutions hindered by concentrated resources. 
However, the conclusions change when we use our preferred adjusted resource proxies 
(net  export  dependency  ratios).  In  this  case,  we  find  a  positive  impact  of  concentrated 
resources  (significant  at  5%)  when  we  leave  out  the  IQ  variable  (regression  5).  Diffuse 
resources  are  not  significant.  Including  IQ,  the  concentrated-resource  variable  is  only 
significant for a p-value of 16% (regression 6), probably because good fiscal policies save 
part of the associated rents, reducing the significance of the concentrated-resource impact.  
                                                
27 However, Manzano and Rigobon (2006) consider a different time frame (two and four panels from 1970 to 
1989) and a different natural-resource measure (the ratio of primary exports to GDP). 
28 In this case, however, the IQ estimate is not significant at 10% in a REM estimation, maybe due to a decreased 
number of observations, 280. We don’t present these results, but they can be made available upon request.   21 
Nevertheless,  in  regression  7  we  disaggregate  the  impacts  of  the  adjusted  resource 
proxies between factor efficiencies considering the IQ variable, and show that concentrated 
resources have a  positive effect  (significant  at 5%) on  growth through capital efficiency, 
while  the  other  resource  impacts are  insignificant at  10%.  This  result  is  in  line  with  the 
positive impact found by studies that use more direct product or reserves measures, such as 
the mining share in GDP, one of the robust growth regressors in Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). 
The  positive  impact  by  capital  efficiency  may  reflect  capital  and  technological  intensity 
owing to the exploitation of those resources, in addition to economies of scale, since the 
geographic concentration allows the dilution of high fixed costs.  
We thus reject the thesis of a resource curse even if the aggregate average effect of 
resource variables is negative, as it results from the sum of non-significant components. We 
stress the average positive contribution of concentrated resources to growth by g (1.6 p.p.). 
In relation the other growth factors in regression 7,
29 the effects of I and T to growth are 
close and smaller than the estimate for Inf. The positive effect of RD (significant at 10%) 
occurs with a  one year lag and  is much smaller  than expected  compared to I,  T  and Inf 
(significant at 1%, 5% and 1%, respectively) probably due to the limitations of our proxy.
30 
The estimate for instrumented IQ is positive but only significant at 10.3%. Capital elasticity is 
30.6% (significant at 1%), below the usual one third estimate considering K income share. 
These conclusions are similar in regression 8, where we use the original IQ variable 
(significant,  in  this  case,  at  5%)  mainly  to  extend  the  estimation  period  and  the  growth 
decompositions for Norway and Venezuela – Figures 2 and 3 below. Both these countries are 
                                                
29 Considering R
2 as a measure of fit to our final estimation, the explanatory variables, with fixed country and 
time effects, capture 52.1% of the variation in w ˆ  (the adjusted R
2 is slightly lower, close to 45%). 
30 The introduction of time lags  only  produced interesting results in the R&D  variable, hence they are not 
considered in other variables (in Table 2), except for the instrumentation of IQ.   22 
rich in oil but presented quite different economic performances from 1975 to 2005 (average 
real  GDPpc  log  growth  rates  of  2.6%  and  -0.6%,  respectively).  We  highlight  the  close 
connection between estimated and actual growth over the period in both cases. As for the 
estimated country effects, they were only significant at 10% for Venezuela. 
Figure  2  depicts  the  decomposition  for  Norway  from  1976  to  2004.  Moreover  the 
positive contribution of L and K, we stress the favourable effects of IQ and T by way of f and 
also of Inf and NresP by way of g. NresP hinders f, but this impact is not significant. 
























































Notes: the lines represent real GDP growth, actual and estimated values; the ones with shaded areas below stand for the 
physical impacts of labour and capital stocks to estimated GDP growth in each year; the columns constitute the TFP impact 
disaggregated between the several items; here, the rectangles with dots are the fixed country and time effects which, along 
with the blue-grey area (the constant term of the wage equation), constitute the share of GDP growth not accountable by the 
explanatory variables; the rectangles associated with labour efficiency are illustrated with ascending lines, while the ones 
related to capital efficiency have descending lines; the impacts of natural resources by labour and capital efficiency are 
highlighted by an orange background. 
 
In Figure 3, we show the decomposition for Venezuela in the estimated period of 1976-1994.  
In this case, the most positive effect to Venezuela’s growth comes from L, followed by K, and 
the effect of Inf and NresP through g. In addition, we find negative effects of NresP by way of   23 
f and also of NresD through g, but they are non-significant. Moreover, T, I and IQ hinder 
growth through f in several years. The negative fixed-country effect also penalises growth. 





























IV. Concluding remarks 
In  this  study  we  re-evaluate  the  impact  of  natural  resources  on  economic  growth.  Since 
physical restrictions related to natural resources are not decisive to growth (except, perhaps, 
in the case of climate change,  which is  not considered  in this  paper), we  focused on its 
negative correlation with resource abundance found in cross-section studies, a result that was 
named the ‘resource curse’. Several theories have been presented to justify this surprising 
result, but only a recent one was sustained by empirical cross-section studies, explaining the 
curse by the negative effect of geographically-concentrated resources on institutional quality, 
which benefits growth. Despite this consensus view, other studies, which explore the impact 
of  more  direct  measures  of  production  or  reserves,  find  positive  impacts  of  concentrated 
resources. In addition, a recent panel study by Manzano and Rigobon (2006) dismissed the 
curse by allowing for unobserved fixed effects, implying that the estimates of the traditional   24 
cross-section regressions may be inconsistent. However, their institutional quality proxy could 
not allow for fixed-effects estimation, and its impact could not be adequately evaluated. 
Bearing in mind these results, we developed a growth accounting framework to estimate 
the contribution of concentrated and diffuse natural resources in a panel-data analysis (which 
allows an increased estimation efficiency and the control of unobserved effects), along with 
the  main growth determinants, through  their impact on labour and capital efficiency. We 
estimated  the  growth  of  unobserved  levels  of  efficiency  (which  constitutes  the  Solow 
residual) using the duality qualities/prices of production factors. Unlike most cross-section 
studies and also Manzano and Rigobon (2006) panel analysis, we also measured institutional 
quality  over  time  to  allow  its  estimation  in  a  fixed-effects  model.  We  considered  the 
interpretation  of  institutions  as  a  reflection  of  policies,  which  we  evaluate  through  fiscal 
policy (measured by the budget balance). This proxy for institutional quality ‘policies’ was 
instrumented with its own lags to avoid endogeneity problems in our analysis, and also to 
reflect the impact of past and present fiscal policies. 
Our results show that the resource curse thesis is dismissed: we find a positive effect on 
capital efficiency arising from our proxy  of geographically-concentrated  natural resources 
(adjusted for re-exportation), exactly the resources that cause the curse in recent cross-section 
studies, by hindering institutional quality. This consensus view does not hold in our case even 
when we use unadjusted resource measures and the standard ‘stable’ institutional approach to 
compare with previous  studies, as both concentrated and diffuse resources show negative 
effects in countries with low institutional quality. Adequate past and present fiscal policy (in 
countries with low ‘stable’ institutional quality), seems to prevent the curse in that case, but 
reduces  the  positive  effect  of  concentrated  resources  found  with  our  preferred  adjusted 
proxies (net export dependency ratios). This positive effect is in line with studies using more 
direct measures of production or reserves, such as the mining share in GDP, confirmed as a   25 
robust  growth  regressor  by  Sala-i-Martin  et  al.  (2004).  The  positive  impact  by  capital 
efficiency may reflect capital and technological intensity owing to the exploitation of those 
resources, in addition to economies of scale, since the geographic concentration allows the 
dilution of high fixed costs.  
In the final fixed effects estimation, the product elasticity in relation to capital has a 
value slightly below the reference level of one third. The impacts of investment and trade to 
growth are close and smaller than the estimate for infrastructures. All these coefficients have a 
significance level of 1% or 5%, whereas institutional quality is only significant at 10.3%. The 
positive impact of R&D only occurs with a one year lag (with a significance level of 10%) 
and is much smaller than anticipated due to the limitations of the available proxy. 
Finally,  using  similar  results  of  the  regression  with  the  uninstrumented  institutional 
quality variable (to extend our estimation period), we decomposed the estimated economic 
growth  for  Venezuela  and  Norway,  two  countries  rich  in  oil  but  with  contrasting 
performances from 1975 to 2005. From the two decompositions we conclude that oil benefits 
growth through capital efficiency but this does not prove decisive. Venezuela has a higher 
impact of concentrated resources, but, contrary to Norway, presents negative contributions 
from  important  growth  factors  such  as  trade,  investment  and  institutional  quality  across 
several years, which justify the lower rates of economic growth. 
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Appendix I – Data treatment and sources 
Variable  Name  Measure  Source  Comments 
Y  Output  GDP at constant prices  U.Nations (National Accounts Database)   
L  Labour  Employment 
ILO (yearly and periodical data) 
OECD (Statistics Database) 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007) 
IMF (IFS) 
UN (UNECE and Statistics Division – Common 
Database) 
The series was extended using growth 
rates of employment, thus reducing 
problems of compatibility between 
sources. 
K  Capital Stock    Authors own calculations with I and Y 
Estimated by the Permanent Inventory 
method
31 
I  Investment  Gross capital formation (constant prices)  U.Nations (National Accounts Database)   
T  Trade  Exports + Imports (constant prices)  U.Nations (National Accounts Database)   
IQ  Institutional Quality  Budget balance in percentage of GDP 
U.Nations (National Accounts Database) 
OECD (Statistics Database) 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007) 
IMF (IFS) 
 
We used compatible data on budget 
balance in percentage of GDP from 
different sources to extend the series. 
NresP  Concentrated natural- Weight of fuels, ores and metals in  World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007)   
                                                
31 The initial capital was obtained following the standard procedure by Harberger (1978). Since 1970 was the first year with available information for I, we calculated 
d r
I K + = 70 70  , in which K70 is the initial capital in 1970, I70 represents the investment in that year (at constant prices), r is the average annual growth rate of GDP between 
1970 and 1980 and d is the depreciation rate (we assumed a value of 6%, as in Hall and Jones, 1999). Ideally, we should use investment data prior to 1970 (since 1960, for 
example) to calculate the initial capital in that year, allowing for a lower instability of capital estimates in the first years (this constitutes a drawback of either of these 
methods), but that was not possible. However, our panel estimations only begin in 1976, so this shouldn’t be a major drawback. The value of capital for the remaining years 
was calculated using the equation of capital dynamics in the Solow-Swan Model: [ ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ) ( t I t K d t K + - - = .   27
resource abundance 
(resource points) 
merchandise exports (unadjusted for re-






Weight of agricultural raw materials and 
food products in merchandise exports 
(unadjusted for re-exportation) net of its 
proportion in imports (adjusted measure) 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007) 
 
 
w ˆ  
Real wage per 
worker growth 
Labour compensation variation (National 
Accounts approach) minus variations  in 
GDP deflator and L  
Sources for labour compensation: 
UN (Common Database) 
OECD (Statistics Database) 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007) 
Source for product deflator: 
UN (Common Database) 
Only compatible labour compensation 
series were used. 
RD 
32  R&D 
number of patent applications to national 
patent offices 
WIPO 
Includes international applications 
under PCT (resident and non-resident); 
excludes applications to regional patent 
offices. 
Inf  Infra-structures 
number of telephone lines and subscriptions 
for mobile telephone services 
UN (Common Database) 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007) 
Data is compatible between sources. 
GDPpc  Income  GDP per capita  UN (National Accounts Database)   
                                                
32 This proxy was chosen due to data availability for a high number of countries and years. A single international patent application has the same effect as national 
applications filed in each designated Contracting State of the PCT. Unfortunately, patent applications to regional patent offices, which concede protection in the area, are not 
reflected in our data. The chosen proxy measures the effect of applied domestic and foreign R&D on internal capital efficiency since it includes patent applications from both 
residents and non-residents, which means that multiple counting is not a problem. According to the WIPO, although patent applications assess R&D activity, three major 
reflections must be considered: not all inventions are patented; the place and time of filing a patent application may not correspond to the place and time of the inventive 
activity; the number of patent applications may vary across countries due to differences in patent systems.   28 




  Country 
t=t0  t=T  Number 
 
Country 
t=t0  t=T  Number 
1  Algeria  1994  2002  9    41  Luxembourg  1999  2003  5 
2  Armenia  2003  2004  2    42  Macedonia  1996  2004  3 
3  Australia  1976  2005  30    43  Malaysia  1991  1995  5 
4  Austria  1976  2005  29    44  Malta  1976  2002  23 
5  Belarus  1998  2003  6    45  Mauritius  1990  1998  9 
6  Belgium  1976  2003  28    46  Mexico  1992  2004  13 
7  Brazil  1993  1998  3    47  Moldova  1996  2004  8 
8  Bulgaria  1996  2004  9    48  Mongolia  1996  2004  4 
9  Canada  1976  2003  28    49  Morocco  1991  1991  1 
10  Chile  1976  2004  26    50  Netherlands  1976  2005  28 
11  Colombia  1976  2002  14    51  New Zealand  1987  2004  17 
12  Costa Rica  1977  1990  9    52  Nicaragua  2000  2000  1 
13  Croatia  1997  2004  8    53  Norway  1976  2005  28 
14  Czech Republic  1996  2005  10    54  Panama  1992  1996  5 
15  Denmark  1976  2005  30    55  Peru  1993  2004  4 
16  Ecuador  1989  1994  2    56  Philippines  1999  2000  2 
17  Egypt   1978  2003  9    57  Poland  1984  2005  17 
18  Estonia  1998  2004  7    58  Portugal  1979  2003  24 
19  Finland  1976  2005  30    59  Romania  1998  2005  7 
20  France  1978  2004  27    60  Russian Federation  1996  2004  8 
21  Georgia  1998  2004  7    61  Saudi Arabia  2000  2000  1 
22  Germany  1976  2005  30    62  Singapore  1998  2004  5 
23  Greece  1988  2004  17    63  Slovak Republic  1996  2005  10 
24  Guatemala  1991  1995  5    64  Slovenia  1995  2005  11 
25  Hungary  1993  2004  12    65  South Africa  1976  2004  14   29 
26  Iceland  1992  2005  14    66  Spain  1990  2005  16 
27  India  1995  1998  4    67  Sri Lanka  1991  1994  4 
28  Indonesia  2004  2004  1    68  Sweden  1976  2000  25 
29  Iran   2001  2001  1    69  Switzerland  1976  2002  26 
30  Ireland  1976  2005  29    70  Tajikistan  2000  2000  1 
31  Israel  1991  2004  12    71  Thailand  1982  2004  19 
32  Italy  1980  1985  6    72  Trinidad and Tobago  1978  2004  8 
33  Jamaica  1976  1979  4    73  Tunisia  2000  2004  5 
34  Japan  1976  2004  28    74  Turkey  1989  2003  14 
35  Kazakhstan  1995  2001  7    75  Ukraine  1999  2004  5 
36  Kenya  1986  1999  4    76  United Kingdom  1976  2005  30 
37  Korea, Rep.  1976  2004  23    77  United States  1976  2004  25 
38  Kyrgyz Republic  1998  2003  6    78  Uruguay  1994  2000  7 
39  Latvia  1995  2004  10    79  Venezuela  1976  1994  15 
40  Lithuania  1994  2004  11    80  Zimbabwe  1986  1993  5 
 
Data based on authors own estimations. 
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￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿( ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿’￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ +! ￿ ￿ ￿
" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿￿" ￿
& ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿1 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ . ￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿
4 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿￿# ￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ - ￿& ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 - ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿& ￿￿￿
￿￿5 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿0 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" $￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( ) ￿6 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿’￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" 9 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿( ￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿: ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿   ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" % ￿
￿ ￿ +￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿: ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿7￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿. ￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" , ￿
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿￿ - ￿￿ - ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿   ￿￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ( ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" 0 ￿
’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿& - ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿’- ￿’- ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿ - ￿￿ - ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿; ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿￿
: ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿. ; ￿ +* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿< ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" " ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ( ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" 5 ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿; ￿9 ￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿; ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿$ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿= ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿" # ￿
’￿￿   ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿< ￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿5 $￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! " ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿’￿￿   ; ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿5 9 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿! " ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ( ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿’￿￿   ; ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’- ￿2 - ￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿& ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿= ￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿’￿￿   ; ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿5 % ￿
= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ . ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ < ￿> ? @ ? ￿
A B B C ￿￿￿’￿￿   ; ￿" # # $￿
￿￿￿￿5 , ￿
’> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿- ￿’- ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿D ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
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